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Recent Decisions
Attachment - Government Levy On State Employee's
Earnings. Sims v. U.S., 359 U.S. 108 (1959). Levies were
served on the petitioner, State Auditor of West Virginia,
seizing the accrued salaries of three employees of the state
government. Petitioner refused to recognize the levies and
paid the accrued salaries to the delinquent taxpayers. The
District Court held him personally liable for the amount
paid. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
and the Supreme Court, relying on Secs. 6331 and 6332 of
the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, in turn affirmed, pointing
out that Sec. 6331 was passed to make levies available
against the unpaid salaries of federal employees as well as
other taxpayers, including state employees. The Court also
referred to Sec. 301.6331-1(a) (4) (ii) of the Treasury Regulations, which declares Sec. 6331 authorizes levies on accrued salaries of employees of a state in order to enforce collection of any federal tax. By a West Virginia statute, the
state auditor is empowered and obligated to deduct withholding tax as required by the government. Another
statute allows garnishments to be served upon him to
sequester salaries of state employees. In that such act
empowered the Auditor to control the disposition of funds
and since his acts defeated the government's valid levy,
the Court reasoned that he was a person "obligated with
respect to" the salaries under Sec. 6332(a) and thus could
be held personally liable.
Annotated Code of Maryland (1957), Art. 9, Sec. 10
states, "Any kind of property or credits belonging to the
defendant, in the plaintiff's own hands, or in the hands of
anyone else, may be attached; . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding this broad provision it has been consistently held that funds in the hands of a public officer,
governmental or municipal corporation cannot be attached,
the predominant reason being the great public inconvenience which would result in taking officials from their duties
to entertain such actions. See Hughes v. Svboda, 168 Md.
440, 178 A. 108 (1935), and Attachment - Public Institutions as Garnishee, 1 Md. L. Rev. 172 (1937). In view
of the Sims case, however, it would seem that the federal
government can levy on the salaries of Maryland's state,
county, and municipal employees under Sec. 6332 of the
Internal Revenue Code. As to state employees, the State
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Comptroller would seem to be the person who could be
held responsible for compliance with such levy. See Maryland Constitution, Art. VI, and 2 Md. Code (1957), Art. 19.
Constitutional Law - Bible Reading And Prayer
Recital In Public Schools. Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S. 2d
453 (1959). In a lengthy and exhaustive opinion which
treated the constitutions of both New York and United
States, New York State Judge Meyer held that a school
board resolution which directed the recital of the following
prayer during morning exercises was invalid: "Almighty
God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and
our Country." The Court concluded that while the Board
could authorize, it could not require, the saying of the
prayer in question. Moreover, if it does authorize such a
prayer, "it must bring the authorization to the attention of
the parents of children in the schools, establish a procedure
for excusing non-participants not only from saying the
prayer but from the room, if they so elect, and take affirmative steps to protect the religious freedom of both nonparticipants and participants".
Approximately one month later, United States Circuit
Judge Biggs for a 3-judge federal District Court in Philadelphia, Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township,
Pa., 177 F. Supp. 398 (D.C. Pa. 1959), held unconstitutional
a Pennsylvania statute which provided for the reading, at
the opening of each school day, of at least ten verses from
the Holy Bible without comment, accompanied by an established practice of reciting the Lord's Prayer, in conjunction with the Bible reading. The Court, in enjoining enforcement of the statute stated that it violated the proscription of the First Amendment as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it both provided for an establishment of religion and interferred with
the free exercise of religion, reasoning: (1) that the Holy
Bible was a Christian document and therefore the daily
reading of it, operating upon the receptive minds of children, aided and preferred the Christian religion and consequently interferred with the free exercise of religion;
(2) that teachers could be discharged for failure to conduct the ceremonies in their class; (3) that school attendance was mandatory upon children, and accordingly that
participation in this religious ceremony was compulsory
even though not, as such, required by statute.
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An effort to have the issue resolved by the Supreme
Court on facts closely related to those of the Schempp case
failed in Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429
(1952), for want of sufficient interest of the complaining
party when suit was brought by a parent, as such, and as a
taxpayer. The Court ruled that, as a parent, his standing
ceased when his child graduated from the school in question, and that as a taxpayer he had not sufficiently shown
the directness of interest required to litigate a constitutional issue.
No dispute of this nature has reached the Maryland
Court of Appeals. The State Board of Education has promulgated no rules concerning morning exercises, but it
appears that in a number of Maryland classrooms, morning
exercises involving the reading of passages from the Holy
Bible and/or recital of the Lord's Prayer or others of a like
nature are conducted. It would seem that generally, the
participation or attendance is voluntary, at least in the
sense of being left to the decision of the children involved
or their parents if objection to participation is raised.
Corporations - Dissenting Stockholder's Right To "The
Fair Value" Of His Stock. Warren v. Baltimore Transit
Co., 220 Md. 478, 154 A. 2d 796 (1959). Appellant, a preferred shareholder, objected to the recapitalization of the
Baltimore Transit Company in 1953, and sought to recover
the "fair market value" of his stock under 2 Md. Code
(1957), Art. 23, Sec. 73. The lower court affirmed the report of appraisers, which set a value of $32.50 a share on
the appellant's stock in the Baltimore Transit Company.
The appraisers had valued the stock as a proportionate
interest in a going concern, considering such factors as
market value and prospective earnings as well as asset
values. Appellant stockholder contended for a valuation
of around $85 a share on the theory that the law required
the appraisers to postulate a liquidation of the corporation
and to determine what the net asset value of the stock
would be on such a liquidation. Appellant relied heavily
upon American General Corporation v. Camp, 171 Md. 629,
637, 190 A. 225 (1936), wherein the Court of Appeals
refused to establish a uniform rule for all "fair value" controversies, but in that instance recognized that ". . . it is
logical and consistent to infer that the fair value of such
stock to a dissenting owner is its intrinsic value on a liquidation .... " The Court of Appeals, affirmed the American
General case, holding that "fair value" of the appellant's
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stock was to be ".... valued as an interest in a continuing
enterprise with whatever benefits and liabilities as to value
its preferred status affords it.... ." In so holding the Court
joined Maryland with New York, Delaware, Ohio and the
general weight of authority. In addition, whether consciously or not, this decision effectively quiets the fears
expressed by an early Maryland Law Review author who
commented on the American General case in 1937 saying,
"If the Court of Appeals has laid down for the future the
rule that asset value in liquidation is controlling, it seems
to run contra to the better reasoned text writers and authorities * * * Viewed in its long-range aspects, the decision (American General) will be unfortunate only if commissioners appointed in future cases regard the opinion as
laying down an instruction that 'asset value in liquidation'
is a conclusive
nimum... .", Note - Appraisalof Shares
of Dissenting Stockholders in Consolidation - American
General Corporationv. Camp, et al., 1 Md. L. Rev. 338, 346
(1937). See also Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS
(1943), Vol. 13, Sec. 5899, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS
(1946), Sec. 299, and Brune, MARYLAND CORPORATE LAw
AND PRACTICE

(1953), Sec. 317.

Evidence - Improper Denial By The Trial Court Of
A Witness' Claim Of Privilege Cannot Be Taken Advantage
Of By A Party. Butz v. State, 221 Md. 68, 156 A. 2d 423
(1959). At defendant's burglary trial, a witness was advised by the defendant's counsel that any further testimony on her part might tend to incriminate her. The witness thereafter claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, but when the State, with concurrence of the trial
judge, granted the witness immunity, the trial judge informed her that she must testify. The witness complied,
without objection, and the defendant was subsequently
convicted. The defendant appealed, relying chiefly on
Chesapeake Club v. State, 63 Md. 446 (1885), and a footnote to that case in MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954), Sec. 73,
n. 8, indicating that Maryland follows the minority view
that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a new
trial whenever material evidence of a witness is admitted
in violation of a privilege of the witness.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the trial
judge was in error in granting immunity to the witness,
but holding that since the privilege belongs to the witness
and not the defendant, material testimony given by the
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witness, even though his claim of privilege has been improperly denied, was admissible against the defendant and
the error in denying the privilege was not a valid ground
of appeal by the defendant. The Court declined to follow
the Chesapeake Club case and aligned Maryland with the
great weight of authority, with only Massachusetts apparently contra (Com. v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 366 (1827)). See

generally,

WIGMORE, EViDFNCE

(3rd ed. 1940), Sec. 2270;

McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE (1954), Sec. 73; and SELECTED WRITINGS ON EVIDENCE AND TRIAL (1957), 190.

Labor Law - States Pre-Empted From Awarding Damages Resulting From Peaceful Picketing. San Diego Building Trades Council, Etc. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
After the National Labor Relations Board declined jurisdiction, presumably for budgetary reasons, of employer's
representative proceedings for injunction of, and damages
arising from, union's peaceful picketing, the California
Supreme Court awarded damages and granted the injunction on the theory that the picketing constituted a tort
under state law [45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P. 2d 1 (1955)1. The
Supreme Court set aside the injunction, 353 U.S. 26 and
when, on remand, the California Court sustained the award
for damages [42 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P. 2d 473 (1958)]. The
Supreme Court again granted certiorari to consider the
damage award. Stating that when activities are either
protected or prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act, the states
are deprived of jurisdiction, the Court in this instance held
that the state court lacked jurisdiction to award the employer damages for peaceful picketing by the union, as
such activity, even if not clearly protected or prohibited,
was arguably within the scope of the Taft-Hartley Act and
therefore pre-empted by Federal Authority. The decision
is a specific application of the ruling in Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), noted, 18 Md. L. Rev. 50
(decided simultaneously with the first Garmon decision),
where the Supreme Court, faced with a question of state
action in a labor dispute where the N.L.R.B. declined jurisdiction for policy reasons, held that the failure of the
N.L.R.B. to assume jurisdiction did not give the States
power over activities that they would otherwise be preempted from regulating.
The Court stressed specifically the danger of state interference with national policy and federal uniformity, but
pointed out that when a state's interest is so urgent to re-
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quire action in situations marked by violence and intimidation, the state courts are not asked to yield to
federal authority, InternationalUnion, United Automobile
Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S.
656 (1954). A concurring opinion by four members of the
Court urged that if past nonviolent tortious conduct was
"clearly" unprotected by Taft-Hartley, the Laburnum and
Russell decisions should allow state courts to award damages, and should not be construed solely as cases of violence allowing state action. See Note, Pre-emption and
Non-regulation - The No Man's Land of Labor Relations,
18 Md. L. Rev. 50 (1958).
It should be observed that Section 701 of the recently
adopted Labor-Management Reform Act, (86 Congress S.
1555, Pub. L. 86-257), amends N.L.R. Sec. 14, by adding
sub-paragraph (c) (2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 164, so as to indicate
that nothing in the Act shall preclude States from assuming jurisdiction over labor disputes over which N.L.R.B.
declines to exercise jurisdiction, which would seem to open
the door to State action that was closed by the Guss and
companion cases, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
Libel And Slander - No Recovery Where Plaintiff
Unable To Prove Application Of Defamatory Words To
Himself. Cohn v. Brecher, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 877 (1959).
Plaintiff and two other employees, being confronted by
their employer, were told that they would be fired if some
missing money was not returned. Looking directly at
plaintiff, defendant said, "One of you is a crook". The N.Y.
Supreme Court held, in dismissing plaintiff's complaint,
that where defamatory language is directed to a small
group, indefinitely or impersonally referring to only one
of the group, one can only recover if he can prove the
application of the language to himself. The fact that defendant looked at plaintiff when he spoke was too speculative
a basis to permit the conclusion that the words were
directed to the latter.
The principal case can be supported by dictum in
Shutter Bar Co. v. Zimmerman, 110 Md. 313, 318, 73 A. 19
(1909), where the Court of Appeals said:
"In order to maintain an action for libel or slander
it must appear that the defamatory words refer to
some ascertained or ascertainable person, and that
person must be the plaintiff."
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On the other hand, plaintiff may be able to recover if the
facts and circumstances unequivocably show that he was
the object of the defamatory language, despite the absence
of a specific reference to his name. Harmon v. Liss, 116 A.
2d 693, 695 (D.C. Mun. App. 1955). For a further digest of
related material, see annotation in 91 A.L.R. 1161, or 33 Am.
JuR., Libel & Slander, Sec. 89; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,
Sec. 564.
Workmen's Compensation - Mental Disability Unaccompanied By Physical Injury Not Compensable. Chernin
v. Progress Service Co., 192 N.Y.S. 2d 758 (1959). A taxi
driver struck a pedestrian who had darted in front of his
cab. Although he sustained no physical injuries, the taxi
driver became quite excited and abusive after police questioning. Claimant taxi driver continued working for a
month after the accident, but was subsequently admitted to
Bellevue Hospital suffering from a severe emotional strain.
The N.Y. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that
claimant could not recover compensation for his mental
disability, unaccompanied by physical injury, which followed but did not result from the accident. The accident,
at most, had aggrevated a dormant repressed schizophrenia.
In Bramble v. Shields, 146 Md. 494, 127 A. 44 (1925), the
only Maryland compensation case dealing with mental disability, the Court of Appeals allowed recovery to an employee who was suffering from a neurosis that resulted
from a physical injury, on the grounds that the ultimate
mental disability was directly attributable to the accidental
injury that arose out of and in the course of employment.
In view of Maryland's "accidental means" requirement
(Kelly-Springfield Co. v. Daniels, 199 Md. 156, 85 A. 2d
795 (1951)), such a disease apparently would not be compensable under the present statute, 8 Md. Code (1957),
Art. 101, Sec. 67.6, if unaccompanied by a physical injury.
See City Ice and Fuel Division v. Smith, 56 S. 2d 329
(Fla., 1952) in accord with the Chernin case, but Bailey v.
American General Insurance Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.
2d 315 (1955), and Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, 25 N.J.
Super. 50, 95 A. 2d 446 (1953), are apparently contra.

